



IoT as an Attack Vector


The DDoS Game Changer!

Sean Newman
Director Product Management






IoT-Based DDoS Dominates the Headlines!...



DDoS Evolving - “DoT” ups the Challenge



- Gartner, Inc. forecasts that Internet connected things will exceed 20 billion by 2020.
- Mirai malware code made public in Oct 2016 spreads to devices with factory default or hard-coded usernames and passwords
- Countless attack vectors and attack types out in the wild - Newly discovered ELF_IMEIJ.A and Amnesia malware
- New techniques, multi-vector attacks, DDoS-for-hire services, coupled with unlimited motivations create a volatile DDoS landscape



Friend or Foe?

<http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317>

Mirai - The Game Changer



- Hacker forum confirms Mirai link to attacks that started this DDoS revolution
- And announcement of the source code being published online, enabling many of the Mirai attacks and derivatives seen since!
- Lightbulb moment that inspired a whole new generation and scale of DDoS attacks

10-01-2016, 07:39 PM (This post was last modified: 10-01-2016 07:39 PM by Anna-senpai.) Post: #7

Anna-senpai L33t Member
Prestige: 11
Posts: 263
Joined: Jul 2016
Reputation: 55

Bob White Wrote: (10-01-2016 07:38 PM)
Proof or it did not happen

Have you seen Krabs On Security recently? im featured in his article for hitting him with 660gbps, and by ovh for hitting 1tbps

Onll-chan!

PM Find TS Report

[FREE] World's Largest Net: Mirai Botnet, Client, Echo Loader, CNC Thread Options
source code release

09-30-2016, 11:50 AM (This post was last modified: 10-01-2016 06:57 PM by Anna-senpai.) Post: #1

Anna-senpai L33t Member
Prestige: 11
Posts: 263
Joined: Jul 2016
Reputation: 55

Preface
Greetz everybody,

When I first go in DDoS industry, I wasn't planning on staying in it long. I made my money, there's lots of eyes looking at IOT now, so it's time to GTFO. However, I know every skid and their mama, it's their wet dream to have something besides qbot.

So today, I have an amazing release for you. With Mirai, I usually pull max 380k bots from telnet alone. However, after the Kreb DDoS, ISPs been slowly shutting down and cleaning up their act. Today, max pull is about 300k bots, and dropping.

So, I am your senpai, and I will treat you real nice, my hf-chan.

And to everyone that thought they were doing anything by hitting my CNC, I had good laughs, this bot uses domain for CNC. It takes 60 seconds for all bots to reconnect, lol

Mirai Botnet Overview



- **Bot** (written in C) targets IoT devices with BusyBox embedded Linux
- Compromised Devices establish **CnC** connection back, to join the Bot
- Existing infected devices also scan for new victims
- New Victims compromised using default username-password list
- **ScanListen** Process (written in GO) listens for bot reporting new victims

• **Loader** (written in C) scans for new victims

```
root/xc3511      root/vizxv      root/admin
admin/admin     root/888888     root/xmhdipc
root/default    root/juantech   root/123456
root/54321      support/support root/(none)
admin/password  root/root       root/12345
user/user       admin/(none)    root/pass
admin/admin1234 root/1111       admin/smcadmin
admin/1111      root/666666    root/password
root/1234       root/klv123    Administrator/admin
service/service supervisor/supervisor guest/guest
guest/12345     guest/12345    admin1/password
administrator/1234 666666/666666 888888/888888
ubnt/ubnt       root/klv1234   root/Zte521
root/hi3518     root/jvbzd     root/anko
```

new victim

Mirai Attack Armoury



- Multiple pre-loaded DDoS attack vectors to choose from:

```
#define ATK_VEC_UDP          0 /* Straight up UDP flood */
#define ATK_VEC_VSE         1 /* Valve Source Engine query flood */
#define ATK_VEC_DNS         2 /* DNS water torture targeting DNS Server */
#define ATK_VEC_SYN         3 /* SYN flood with options */
#define ATK_VEC_ACK         4 /* ACK flood */
#define ATK_VEC_STOMP       5 /* ACK flood with crude mitigation evasion */
#define ATK_VEC_GREIP       6 /* GRE IP flood */
#define ATK_VEC_GREETH      7 /* GRE Ethernet flood */
//#define ATK_VEC_PROXY     8 /* Proxy knockback connection */
#define ATK_VEC_UDP_PLAIN   9 /* Plain UDP flood optimized for speed */
#define ATK_VEC_HTTP       10 /* HTTP layer 7 GET flood */
```

- Easy for derivatives to modify or include additional vectors

New Malware/Botnets Leveraging IoT



- **ELF_IMEIJ.A**¹ Targeting AVTech Cameras
 - 130,000 Vulnerable devices, of just one device type!
 - cgi-bin script pings random IPs searching for vulnerable devices
 - Uses reported CloudSetup.cgi command injection vulnerability
 - Tricks device into downloading and changing file's permissions to execute it locally

- **Tsunami Botnet Variant "Amnesia2"** Targeting TVT DVRs
 - Leverages remote code execution vulnerability, unpatched since March 2016
 - 227,000 Known Vulnerable Devices from same OEM manufacturer
 - Includes Malware Analysis Sandbox Evasion Techniques
 - Spreads by scanning for new devices to infect – similar to Mirai



¹ Originally Discovered by Trend Micro Researchers in October 2016

² Recently Discovered by Palo Alto Networks 'Unit 42' Researchers

The Answer - Community Responsibility?



Carriers can do more to enable 'clean pipe' to their downstream subscribers – cleaning up attack traffic as well as ensuring that compromised devices on their access network are quickly identified and remediated



Device Manufacturers must put security measures in place. E.g. No device should connect to the Internet 'out of the box'



May require government legislation forcing Carriers and Manufactures of IoT devices alike to work toward eliminating the problem




Can the security industry do more – for example the newly formed IoT Cybersecurity Alliance?

Probably *not* the Answer – BrickerBot!



- Vigilante Mirai-like Bot, disabling poorly secured IoT devices!





Questions?





Thank You!

