MAC randomisation – considering privacy features with potential unintended network consequences

Plus a quick update on DoH and ECH

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Background – The history behind MAC addresses

- A Media Access Control (MAC) address is a unique identifier assigned to a network interface controller, e.g. Wi-Fi or Ethernet.

- It takes the format of a 48-bit address
  - the first 3 octets identifying the device manufacturer through an Organisationally Unique Identifier
  - the latter 3 octets identifying the specific network interface controller, e.g. unique to the device.



- It is standardised by the IEEE, and is visible unencrypted in Wi-Fi polling and connection handshakes.

- To enhance privacy IEEE, Applications and Operating Systems have started to introduce various forms of randomisation.

- Like other internet protocols, ISPs have found many wider uses of MAC addresses, e.g. automatic Wi-Fi connection, access control and customer support.

- This presentation outline thoughts on balancing MAC randomisation privacy features with potential unintended consequences on the network and customer experience.

- Focussing on the main impact area – Wi-Fi connectivity.

MAC address evolution – Phase 0 No Randomisation

- Mainly legacy devices

- Always use the same permanent MAC address for both Wi-Fi polling / probe requests and connectivity.





- No privacy through randomisation

- No impact to existing ISP networks and customer service.

MAC address evolution – Phase 1 Probe Randomisation only

- Some devices

- Random MAC addresses for each probe request to offer some form of privacy



- But still uses permanent MAC address for Wi-Fi connections.



- No impact to existing ISP networks and customer service as same MAC address always used per connection.

MAC address evolution – Phase 2 Probe + per SSID randomisation

- Latest devices and Operating Systems.

- Random MAC addresses for each probe request



- Plus for added privacy different MAC addresses for connection on a per SSID / realm basis, but re-used for subsequent connections.



- No impact to existing ISP networks and customer service as same MAC address always used for same SSID connection.

MAC address evolution – Phase 3 Probe + per session/day randomisation

- **Option exists now in Microsoft Windows 10.**
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4027925/windows-how-and-why-to-use-random-hardware-addresses

- **Apple announced through developer conference their plans around Private Wi-Fi in iOS 14.**
  - https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2020/10676/ Private Wi-Fi update starts at 21:30

- **Random MAC addresses for each probe request**



- **Plus for FULL privacy randomised MAC addresses for connection on a per session basis / per day / per network SSID.**



- **Maximises privacy, but risks creating unintended consequences to customer experience and support.**
  - **For example impacts to public hotspot seamless MAC authentication, time of day access controls, device based parental controls and regulatory obligations.**

Per Session MAC randomisation impact areas & mitigation options

Area	Impact	Mitigation Options
Public Wi-Fi Hotspots	• Breaks MACs authentication journey used by many public Wi-Fi hot spot providers to allow seamless connection after initial registration. • Impacts any network diagnostics based on device MAC address.	• Move to use of Wi-fi Passpoint / 802.1X but this may require additional user interaction in terms of accepting certificates / profiles and provisioning journey for non-SIM devices.
Broadband: Customer Support	• Potential inability to identify device make, model and number of devices connected at home to aid customer contact troubleshooting. • Impacts Home Wi-Fi diagnostic capabilities. • May impact future device steering between access points and bands (2.4GHz / 5GHz)	• Longer term use of any new IEEE 802.11 physical layer identifiers. • Wi-fi Alliance – Wi-fi Certified Easy Connect (DPP) capabilities where it uses per device specific connectors. • Per device passwords to identify devices, but needs automatic password provisioning solution, e.g. DPP. • In theory Wi-fi Passpoint but need to consider provisioning journey aspects. • For some devices DHCP friendly name may be unique within the home, e.g. Joe's iPad – could potentially use this, but only as a partial solution.
Broadband: Access Controls & Content Filtering	• Breaks per device time of day access controls in home equipment as many of these are based on MAC address. • Breaks any per device broadband parental controls based on MAC addresses.	

Current focus on laptops, tablets and smart phones what are the additional impacts if rolled out to IoT devices?

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Next steps, if your services could be impacted by MAC randomisation

- **Read background to MAC randomisation from IEEE RCM TIG working group**
  - https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/19/11-19-0588-01-0rcm-summary-of-discussions-on-randomized-and-changing-mac-addresses-2014-2019.odt
  - https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/19/11-19-1442-09-0rcm-rcm-tig-draft-report-outline.odt
- **Check out Apple and Microsoft information**
  - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4027925/windows-how-and-why-to-use-random-hardware-addresses
  - https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2020/10676/ Private Wi-Fi update starts at 21:30
- **Identify your service and support dependencies on MAC address and mitigation options**
- **Engage in a potential new IEEE 802.11 Task Group covering MAC randomisation and wider Wi-Fi security**
  - https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/20/11-20-0990-01-0rcm-security-and-privacy-maintenance-task-group-par-ideas.pptx
- **Talk to your Operating System contacts**

Encrypted DNS and ECH developments to check-out

- **Apple Developer Conference videos on privacy and encrypted DNS**
  - https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2020/10676 timestamp 11:55
  - https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2020/10047/
- **IETF Encrypted Client Hello (ECH)**
  - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/
  - **Addresses fact that HTTPS still shows site name at the start of every connection.**
- **Encrypted DNS and ECH have the potential to cause unintended consequences to:**
  - **Existing ISP DNS and packet inspection based content filtering (parental controls, malware protection & regulatory/court order)**
  - **Network cyber security intelligence**
  - **ISP use of local on-net content caches**
  - **ISP / Network Operator Customer troubleshooting**
  - **Zero rating, the ability to identify and classify known content/services to exclude from usage-based charging**
- **Encourage ISP/Operators to review impacts and engage in OS, Industry Alliances and IETF discussions**

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Conclusion

- **BT looks favourably on new capabilities that enhance privacy and security for our customers.**

- **However whilst increasing privacy, further MAC randomisation risks creating unintended consequences to customer experience and support.**
  - **For example impacts to public hotspot seamless MAC authentication, time of day access controls, device based parental controls and regulatory obligations.**

- **In a similar way Encrypted DNS and ECH privacy comes with impacts to existing content filtering, zero rating and customer support capabilities.**

- **BT would welcome continued industry dialogue on balancing these emerging privacy features with unintended consequences on network and customer experience.**